Subject: Re: Encryption (was: Re: netatalk.com)

From: Steve Freitas <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2000 17:23:30 -0700

>This isn't possible with rand*num encryption, that's the reason DHX was
>created.  The randnums use a 1-way hash of the password for authentication,
>and the server can't validate the hash unless it has the original
>cleartext password on disk.  Thus the .passwd file.

Thanks for the explanation. I retract my request. :-)

>Here's a deeper problem: DHX appears to be inferior to rand2num because
>with rand2num, the authentication handshake doesn't succeed until the
>server can prove to the client that it knows the user's password too.
>This prevents a rogue server from impersonating a real server.  DHX
>doesn't appear to do this, so the security level is more like randnum,
>which doesn't verify the server's identity.  Am I missing something?

Hmm, I'm tired of constantly chasing the next authentication scheme. Is 
there another one out there what solves all of these problems?

---

From: Tom Fitzgerald <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 01 Aug 2000 21:00:30 -0400

> there another one out there what solves all of these problems?

Kerberos :-)

Seriously, DHX looks like the best option for most people, especially
multiplatform shops, since it seems to integrate well with non-atalk
auth options and gives everything you need for basic security at an SSH
level.  (I haven't actually run it on a production server....)  Rand2num
is great if nearly all your users are Mac-only and you can treat people
who actually need to login to Unix as special cases - and either you
don't have PCs or don't care about having passwords common between the
Macs and PCs.  It's a series of tradeoffs, like anything, there's no
one-size-fits-all.

Kerberos would be for people who are fanatic about security, or who
already have a kerberos infrastructure.  For everyone else it's just more
trouble than it's worth.